Japanese Scramble Policies

Dennis C. Blair, Former Commander in Chief of the U.S. Pacific Command (Photo by Yuko Lanham)

Chinese and Russian maritime and air activity in the waters and airspace of Japan have increased in recent years. The latest figures published by the Japanese Ministry of Defense, for April-June 2018, report 271 scrambles by the Japan Air Self-Defense Force, an increase of 42 times over the same period the previous year. China’s Navy and Air Force are growing in number and sophistication of platforms, and China has been sending ships and aircraft in increasing numbers through international waters around Japan, through their Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ), Air Defense Identification zones (ADIZ), contiguous zones, and even territorial waters and airspace. Russia has also been building its Pacific forces in recent years, and increasing its air activity around Japan. The Japanese government interprets this Chinese and Russian activity as a threat, intercepts all Chinese and Russian airplanes or ships as they approach these zones, and escort them throughout their flight or voyage.

Although this intercept and escort policy seems a sensible way of protecting Japan’s sovereignty, demonstrating that a country’s armed forces are on their guard and can defend their territory, it comes at a cost in military effectiveness. “Scrambles” of alert aircraft to intercept Chinese and Russian aircraft and rapid sorties of alert surface ships to intercept Chinese ships are simple tactical evolutions that provide little training value in wartime skills. The pattern of reactions provides intelligence insights to the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and the Russian military intelligence services about Japanese surveillance and reaction capabilities, insights that can be used to the PLA’s and Russian Armed forces’ advantage in combat operations. The budget effects of these “intercept and escort everything” policies are more important. They use up flying and steaming hour budgets, leaving less money available for complex exercises to hone more difficult skills that will be needed in wartime. With its “intercept everything” policy, Japan is degrading its readiness to defend their territory in conflict. It is Japanese joint defense capability to defeat island invasions and to retake occupied islands that will deter Chinese military aggression, not a 100% record of intercepting PLA probes.

How can these policies be changed without appearing as a weakening of resolve and capability? The Japanese Ministry of Defense and its Self Defense Forces are under strong political pressure to intercept and escort every Chinese and Russian sortie near their territory. It seems sensible that China and Russia should not be able to operate freely around Japanese territory. However, neither should China and Russia should be able to manipulate Japan to spend its scarce defense budgets in an inefficient and ineffective manner.

How should Japan change its policies?

Dennis C. Blair, Former Commander in Chief of the U.S. Pacific Command (Photo by Yuko Lanham)

How should Japan change its policies and military operations?

A first step is for Japan to decide how much of its Air and Maritime Self Defense Force operating budgets should be spent on intercept and escort operations, and how much should be spent on training for wartime missions. There is no correct proportion, but intercept and escort operations should consume only a small fraction of training budgets, say ten per cent.

A second step is for the Japanese government to make new policies for intercept and escort. Under these new concepts, Japan would not automatically intercept and escort all Chinese flights and voyages near its waters and air space. The Self Defense Force would be selective and unpredictable, not revealing its full capabilities but demonstrating that it is closely following Chinese activity and can intercept it if it chooses to do so.

Additionally, Japanese government and defense leaders need to educate the public about the new, more effective policy and about the difference between military operations in peacetime and in conflict. The public needs to know, for example, that all countries, including China, under international law have the right to operate their ships and aircraft in international waters in peacetime. They need to know that Japanese ships and vessels also have the right to operate freely in waters and airspace close to China, and that no country owns international waters and air space beyond 12 miles from its shores.

To emphasize this point, Japan should send some of its own ships and aircraft on occasion into international waters closer to China. China will react with its own intercept and escort operations, as it does with American air and surface ship operations near China. China will respond publicly with denunciations of the Japanese and Taiwanese operations as “hostile and threatening,” while insisting that its own similar operations are peaceful and pose no threat. The contradiction will not be lost on Japanese citizens.

Japanese citizens also need to know that China can operate its ships and aircraft in peacetime in locations that would not be possible in wartime. To drive this point home, Japanese forces can use Chinese operations around its waters to exercise wartime skills. China has refurbished an old aircraft carrier, the Liaoning, and when it operates in the East China Sea, press reports trumpet a major increase in the PLA’s capability. In fact, this old vessel, with a very small air wing aboard and a rudimentary battlegroup of other ships and aircraft to support it, is extremely vulnerable in wartime. The Japan Self Defense Forces have the capability to disable it quickly. Japanese defense forces can take advantage of a Liaoning voyage near Japanese waters to conduct simulated attacks, raising their own readiness, and demonstrating the reality that the Liaoning is vulnerable under wartime conditions.

Finally, the Japanese public needs to know that it is wartime military capability, not peacetime operations, that deters a potential aggressor like China from acting to enforce the claims it makes on Japanese territory. Chinese operations in peacetime around Japan are the contemporary version of venerable gunboat diplomacy, intended to intimidate and to cause concessions without conflict. Taiwanese and Japanese citizens need to understand that it is the capability of their defense forces to defeat Chinese aggression in wartime that provides the ultimate protection for their sovereignty and independence.